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CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
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Gabriel Markoff
ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom states that prosecuting corporations can
subject them to terrible collateral consequences that risk putting them out
of business and causing massive social and economic harm. According to
this viewpoint, which has come to dominate the literature following the
demise of Arthur Andersen after that firm’s prosecution in the wake of the
Enron scandal, even a criminal indictment can be a “corporate death
penalty.” The Department of Justice (DOJ) has implicitly accepted this
view by declining to prosecute many large companies in favor of using
criminal settlements called deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). Yet,
there is no evidence to support the existence of the “Andersen Effect” and
the much-hyped corporate death penalty. Indeed, no one has ever
empirically studied what happens to companies after conviction. In this
Article, I do just that. Using the database of organizational convictions
made publicly available by Professor Brandon Garrett, I find that no
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publicly traded company failed because of a conviction that occurred in the
years 2001 to 2010. Moreover, many convictions included plea agreements
that imposed compliance programs such as those that some advocates view
as a key justification for using DPAs. Because corporate convictions do
not have the terrible consequences they were assumed to have and because
convictions can be used to obtain compliance programs just as effectively
as DPAs can, the DOJ should prosecute more law-breaking companies and
reserve DPAs for extraordinary circumstances. In the absence of some
other justification for using DPAs, the DOJ should exploit the stronger
deterrent value of corporation prosecution to its full capacity.
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INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen the dawning of a
new era of criminality. This new era has been planned and perpetuated not
by such traditional criminal players as organized crime or drug cartels, but
instead by the large, multinational corporations that are essential actors in
both the economy and society at large. Since the Enron scandal burst open
in late 2001, marking the beginning of a decade of fraud and wrongdoing
that culminated in the recent financial crisis, the criminal acts of large
corporations have rocked the nation and brought the world economy to its
knees. It is no exaggeration to say that corporate crime, and the struggle to
counteract it, has become one of the most pressing legal issues of the new
millennium.
Under current law, there are a number of ways to combat corporate
crime. Corporations can be prosecuted to impose punitive fines and the
stigma of conviction, corporate officers can be prosecuted to ensure that
individuals who break the law on behalf of their corporations are punished,
structural reforms and compliance programs may be implemented through
the use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements, and the entire body of
civil and regulatory law can be used to impose fines and win compensation
for victims.1 Each of these methods has its proponents and detractors. In
this Article, I provide novel empirical evidence to demonstrate that the first
of these methods, the criminal prosecution of the corporate entity itself, has
been fundamentally misunderstood by scholars, commentators, and
policymakers.
While the fact that corporations cannot be imprisoned has long been
recognized as an inherent incongruity of corporate criminal liability,2 most
commentators believe that corporate prosecutions play an important role in
deterring corporate crime.3 That said, there is a broad consensus—and a

1. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 875–86
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform] (reviewing alternative means of combating
corporate crime).
2. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
389–90 (1981) (discussing the deterrent value of corporate prosecutions for intangible
entities).
3. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 271, 273–74 (2008) (noting that the consensus among scholars favors some measure
of corporate criminal liability). This belief is not universal, however. A prominent voice
against corporate criminal liability is that of Professor Richard Epstein, a leading member of
the law and economics movement. See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution
Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14 (arguing that the government should limit
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deep fear—that the stigma and side effects of corporate prosecutions can be
so damaging that they pose a severe risk of driving companies out of
business. Therefore, many believe that prosecutions should be limited to
avoid this result.4 The belief that prosecutions are a “corporate death
penalty” was amplified immeasurably by the collapse of Arthur Andersen
LLP, Enron’s accountant, after Arthur Andersen was convicted of
obstruction of justice for destroying tons of potentially incriminating
documents in the days leading up to Enron’s implosion.5 For many
commentators, it is now unquestioned dogma that a criminal indictment
alone can easily destroy even a large, powerful corporation.6
In large part because of the backlash caused by Andersen’s demise,
the DOJ has shifted its approach to enforcing the criminal law against large
corporations.7 While small companies are still routinely convicted, usually
through plea agreement though sometimes by trial verdict, many large
corporations are not actually prosecuted; instead they receive settlements
known as deferred or non-prosecution agreements (collectively, DPAs).8
These DPAs are, for all intents and purposes, criminal settlement
agreements by which companies agree to cooperate with the government,
admit some level of wrongdoing, pay fines and restitution, implement
compliance programs, and undertake other reforms, all in exchange for the
government’s agreeing to not prosecute the corporation.9 In theory, these
arrangements are mutually beneficial: DPAs supposedly allow the DOJ to
efficiently enforce the law and obtain monetary restitution for victims
while also permitting companies to avoid criminal conviction and the
resulting “Arthur Andersen Effect,” that is, the expense, stigma, and other
collateral consequences that accompany a criminal conviction.
DPAs themselves are highly controversial in many respects. Criticism
of these agreements runs the gamut. Some scholars, particularly members

criminal law enforcement to suits against individuals).
4. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 3, at 274 (“Yet, the prevailing view is that
prosecutors should balance the need to deter corporate crime against a conviction’s dire
consequences for employees and other innocent stakeholders.”).
5. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 929–
34 (2004) (describing Andersen’s destruction of Enron documents).
6. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (listing scholars who argue that
criminal indictments can destroy even the most established companies). Andersen itself, of
course, was a professional services partnership and not a corporation, but this important fact
is often ignored by commentators.
7. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 1, at 880, 887–89.
8. Id.
9. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007).
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of the law and economics movement, argue that DPAs can often constitute
extreme abuses of prosecutorial discretion.10 Other scholars decry DPAs as
a means of letting corporate criminals escape with a slap on the wrist.11
And others advocate for specific reforms while accepting DPAs as a
legitimate tool.12 Unfortunately, in spite of the great volume of
commentary on the matter, there is little to no empirical proof that DPAs
are effective at deterring or otherwise preventing corporate crime, and there
is anecdotal evidence of DPAs failing spectacularly at preventing corporate
recidivism. While a few scholars have performed invaluable empirical
studies of DPAs by laboriously gathering them and documenting their
attributes,13 the question of whether DPAs “work” has not been answered.14
I attempt to answer a different question, one that has been almost
entirely ignored in the literature. The question that should be asked, from
the policymaker’s perspective, is not whether DPAs “work,” but whether
DPAs work better than actual corporate prosecutions and convictions. As
is generally recognized in the literature, prosecutions have a stronger
deterrent effect than do DPAs, which typically lack the stigma and
potential collateral consequences that accompany convictions. Therefore,
because their deterrent value is weaker, the use of DPAs can only be
justified if DPAs provide some other advantage that prosecutions lack.
Recognizing this problem, DPA advocates generally cite two purported
advantages to justify the use of DPAs. The first, as already mentioned, is
that corporate prosecutions cannot be used in many cases because they risk
causing huge social costs, such as massive job losses, by dooming
companies to the fate of Arthur Andersen. The second is that DPAs can be
used to force corporations to voluntarily agree to valuable structural
reforms and compliance programs that are unavailable in the adversarial
10. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3 (arguing that the government is abusing the threat of
prosecution in order to unfairly coerce corporations into DPAs).
11. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775,
1795 (2011) [hereinafter Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions] (noting that some
advocates condemn the trend away from corporate prosecutions).
12. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over
Waiver of the Attorney–Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2008) (arguing that
prosecutors should continue to have the power to demand that corporations waive the
attorney–client privilege as a condition of receiving DPAs, but that additional protections
should be added to protect individuals’ rights against self-incrimination).
13. See, e.g., Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 1 (analyzing the characteristics of
thirty-five DPAs entered into between 2003 and 2007).
14. This is not to say that nobody has tried to do so. See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David
Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679
(2009) (using targeted interviews to attempt to draw anecdotal evidence of the success or
failure of corporate monitors put in place as part of DPAs).
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setting of a prosecution.
This Article presents novel evidence that DPAs possess neither of
these proposed advantages. The Article surveys every available federal
conviction of a publicly traded company that occurred in the years between
2001 and 2010, inclusive, and concludes that the risk of driving companies
out of business through prosecutions has been radically exaggerated, and
that prosecutions can indeed be used to obtain structural reforms. When
viewed in light of the empirical evidence, the DOJ’s policy of preferring
DPAs is unsupportable. The Article proceeds in the following manner.
Part I discusses the background of corporate criminal liability and the
government’s trend toward using DPAs. Part II discusses the methodology
used in analyzing the available data and explains how the survey was
conducted and the results were obtained. Part III lays out the results of the
study and discusses some of the implications of these results. Finally, Part
IV makes a normative prescription: In most cases, the use of DPAs should
be phased out in favor of pursuing corporate criminal convictions.
Because the risk of driving large companies out of business through
prosecution is far less than the conventional wisdom assumes—and is
perhaps even negligible—and because convictions can also be used to
obtain structural reforms, then, in the absence of some other justification
for the use of DPAs, the use of corporate convictions should be favored
because of their naturally stronger deterrent value.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. Corporate Criminal Liability Pre-Andersen
In the United States, corporations have long been held liable for the
criminal acts of their employees. The traditional common law rule that
corporations could not be held criminally liable for most acts had largely
vanished by the early twentieth century.15 As early as 1909, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that corporations could be criminally liable for crimes
of intent that were committed by their employees.16 Since then, the
doctrine of respondeat superior has allowed corporations to be convicted
for the criminal acts of their employees so long as those acts were made in
15. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479–83 (1996) (discussing the historical development of corporate
criminal liability from sixteenth-century English law to twentieth-century American law).
16. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909);
Khanna, supra note 15, at 1482–83.
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the scope of employment and with the intent of benefitting the
corporation.17 The doctrine is broadly applicable, and corporations have
been held liable for almost all types of crimes, with the exception of crimes
like murder or rape, which in many jurisdictions require a particular type of
malicious intent on the part of the wrongdoer.18
Even so, until the 1990s, corporate prosecutions were a minor part of
American law. Before that time, prosecutions occurred but fines were very
small, much smaller than the penalties imposed by the administrative
actions and private lawsuits that inevitably arise as a result of corporate
law-breaking.19 Things began to change with the passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act in 1984, which established the U.S. Sentencing Commission
and, ultimately, the federal Sentencing Guidelines.20 In light of evidence
that organizations were, on average, receiving criminal fines that did not
even rise to the level of the damage their crimes caused, the Commission
determined to create guidelines that would follow a modified version of the
“optimal deterrence” school of law and economics thought.21 In the end,
the guidelines radically increased penalties for corporate criminal liability
while also allowing reduced punishments and incentives for good faith
cooperation by corporate defendants.22
Armed with the power to seek larger, more punitive fines, the DOJ
began to ramp up corporate prosecutions during the 1990s.23 This
development was legally strengthened in 1999, when then-Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder drafted the first set of DOJ guidelines to provide
instructions on how federal prosecutors were to prosecute corporations.24
17. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 3, at 277, 295.
18. This limitation has been long noted. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 828–29 (1927) (listing court decisions holding that
corporations could not be held liable for crimes involving a conspicuous element of mens
rea); Khanna, supra note 15, at 1484 (noting the longstanding acceptance of this limitation).
19. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 388, 405–06 (noting that criminal fines for corporate
crime were “insignificant” before 1980, and describing in detail the relatively tiny fines
imposed for criminal antitrust violations).
20. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). See
Ilene M. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About
Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 206–08 (1993) (describing the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission’s work on drafting guidelines for
organizational sentences).
21. Nagel & Winthrop, supra note 20, at 214–22.
22. Id.
23. See Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1870 (stating
that the number of corporate convictions rose through the 1990s, but cautioning that some of
the rise might be due to better data collection).
24. Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse
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This “Holder Memo,” as it became known, advised prosecutors to base
charging decisions against corporations on the same factors used in
prosecuting individuals, such as the sufficiency of the evidence, the
likelihood of success at trial, and the deterrent value of prosecution.25
However, the Holder Memo supplemented these factors with eight
additional factors unique to organizational prosecutions: (1) “the nature
and seriousness of the offense”; (2) the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing
within the corporation”; (3) the corporation’s history of past criminal
conduct; (4) the corporation’s timely disclosure and willingness to
cooperate; (5) the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program; (6)
the remedial actions the corporation had undertaken; (7) the collateral
consequences of prosecution to innocent shareholders and employees; and
(8) the “adequacy of non-criminal remedies.”26
In 2000, the year after the Holder Memo was issued, the number of
corporate convictions reached an all-time high of approximately 300.27 The
Holder Memo has since been superseded by other DOJ guidance
documents, but the factors it outlined remain the basic framework on which
charging decisions are made. However, the politics of corporate criminal
prosecution were to change dramatically only three years after the memo
was published, even though the law itself did not change. The catalyst for
this shift was the dramatic downfall of Arthur Andersen.
B. The Collapse of Arthur Andersen and the Move Toward DPAs
Arthur Andersen LLP, formerly one of the “big five” accounting
firms, was the outside accountant of Enron Corporation.28 In that role,
Andersen was at least negligent of—and many commentators believe
complicit with—the fraudulent accounting schemes that contributed to
Enron’s downfall.29 And, as Enron entered its death throes in the weeks
leading up to its bankruptcy filing in late 2001, high-ranking Andersen
partner David Duncan, the leader of Andersen’s Enron account, ordered
in the Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 239 (2009).
25. Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen. to the Component Heads & U.S.
Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corps. (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo], available at http://federalevidence.com/corporate-prosecution-principles.
26. Id.
27. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1870.
28. Brickey, supra note 5, at 917.
29. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 143–49 (2003) (describing Andersen’s
failure to challenge Enron’s questionable and ultimately fraudulent accounting practices).
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Andersen employees to destroy enormous quantities of Enron documents.30
While the shredding eventually stopped in early November 2001, after the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) subpoenaed Andersen, the
firm had by that time already destroyed literally tons of documents that
could have provided evidence of Enron’s wrongdoing and of Andersen’s
own complicity.31
Andersen publicly admitted the document destruction in January
2002.32 At that point, its major clients began fleeing in droves, and
Andersen began negotiating with the government to avoid criminal
prosecution.33 Avoiding prosecution without admitting guilt was crucial to
the firm’s chances of survival because Andersen had previously admitted to
its involvement in numerous other fraudulent schemes. Indeed, it had
settled criminal charges in 1996 by agreeing to a DPA, and, just months
before the Enron debacle, the SEC had censured Andersen as part of a
settlement permanently enjoining the firm from violating the federal
securities laws.34 If Andersen admitted its fault, it would have further
damaged its reputation, and a conviction would likely have resulted—as it
ultimately did—in the SEC’s disbarring Andersen from auditing public
companies. Therefore, Andersen was desperate to avoid admitting to
wrongdoing.35 To that end, it offered to enter into a DPA, to follow a new
compliance program, and to have an independent monitor appointed to
ensure that it followed the law.36 However, it refused to admit wrongdoing
even as part of a DPA that would allow it to avoid conviction, and the DOJ
quite reasonably would not agree to such an extravagant demand.37
Andersen was indicted in March 2002, and its business crumbled in the
time leading up to its conviction that June.38
The backlash against the government’s actions was immediate.
Andersen’s defense strategy had revolved heavily on a public relations

30. Brickey, supra note 5, at 929–34.
31. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 29, at 383.
32. Brickey, supra note 5, at 920.
33. Id. at 924–25, 951.
34. Id. at 922–27.
35. Id. at 921, 924–26.
36. Id. at 921, 924–26.
37. Id. at 924–26.
38. Andersen’s conviction was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court because of
error in the jury instructions. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698
(2005). Though the reversal did not damage the government’s factual case, and a retrial
would likely have been successful, the DOJ decided not to retry the case on remand, as the
business was already long defunct. John C. Roper et al., Government won’t retry Anderson
criminal case, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 23, 2005, at B1.
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campaign that tried the case in the popular press; even while the trial was
ongoing, the firm loudly decried the prosecution’s actions as a witch hunt.39
While the attack on the DOJ did not help Andersen, the idea that corporate
prosecutions are unjustifiably dangerous has lived on and dominates
academic discussions of corporate wrongdoing. Andersen’s collapse, many
commentators argue, showed that a mere indictment can destroy even a
huge, established company by causing extreme reputational damage and by
triggering other collateral consequences, such as disbarment, exclusion
from government contracts, or the activation of loan covenants that raise
the cost of borrowing.40 Some commentators even veer into the hyperbolic
and go so far as to make such claims as the following: “Indictment alone,
prior to any litigation, usually results in the death of any business entity by
means of reputational damage in the marketplace and damage to the
financial interests of its shareholders and investors.”41
Following this torrid criticism, the DOJ changed its tactics. While
small companies are usually still convicted (either by guilty verdict after a
trial or by plea agreement), the DOJ has embraced the use of DPAs as an

39. See Brickey, supra note 5, at 942–45 (describing Andersen’s public relations
campaign, which involved employee protests, newspaper advertisements, grassroots
lobbying of Congress and the DOJ by employees, and a website that hosted papers claiming
that the prosecution was legally flawed and an abuse of the government’s power).
40. See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 426 (2007) (“A criminal indictment can have devastating
consequences for a corporation and risks the market imposing what is in effect a corporate
death penalty.”); Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in
Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1436 (2007) (“When
Andersen collapsed after its indictment, federal prosecutors realized that prosecution alone
could destroy even the most established of companies.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Op-Ed.,
Over Before it Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A23 (“But Andersen’s demise did
serve as a stern reminder to corporate America that prosecutors can bring down or cripple
many of America’s leading corporations simply by indicting them on sufficiently serious
charges. No trial is necessary.”); see also, e.g., James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment
and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 511 (2006) (“In short, the
United States Government has the power to destroy a partnership, such as an accounting or
law firm, without the burden of trial or having to provide evidence of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”). Notably, the fact that Andersen was a partnership, a form of the
corporate entity that is often more fragile than that of a corporation or limited liability
company, is only rarely mentioned.
41. Matt Senko, Note, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 164 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Edward
B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely
American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 128–29
(2008) (“[I]t is common wisdom within the business community that a conviction amounts
to a potentially lethal blow for a corporation, one from which the corporation may not
recover even if it is actually innocent . . . .”).
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alternative means of enforcing the criminal law against many large
companies, particularly publicly traded corporations.42
As already
mentioned, by using DPAs, the DOJ avoids the potential collateral
consequences of indictment and conviction while obtaining structural
reforms and the corporation’s aid in prosecuting individual corporate
officers. In exchange, the DOJ gives up the increased deterrent effect of
actually prosecuting the corporation itself. Pursuant to this new strategy,
corporate convictions have declined from a high of 300 in the year 2000 to
an average of less than 200 (mostly small) convicted organizations per year
for the years 2001–2010, with only 145 organizations convicted in 2010.43
By contrast, the number of DPAs has climbed steadily, from a handful per
year before Andersen to an average of approximately 30 per year, the vast
bulk of which are entered into by large, multinational corporations.44
C. Where We Stand Today: The Controversies of the Modern DPA
Era
DPAs are enjoying their time in the sun, their use bolstered by a
continued belief in the devastating power of the Andersen Effect.45 Indeed,
at the same time this Article was being submitted for publication, former
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, until recently the head of the
DOJ’s Criminal Division, extolled the virtues of DPAs in a now-famous
speech to the New York City Bar Association.46 Breuer noted that “DPAs
have become a mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement” and
praised them as having “a truly transformative effect on particular
companies and, more generally, on corporate culture across the globe.”47 In
42. Griffin, supra note 9, at 321–22; see Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions,
supra note 11, at 1804 (noting that most corporations that are convicted are relatively
small). Indeed, as I found while conducting this study, large, public corporations receive
DPAs almost twice as often as they are convicted. In the years 2001–2010, eighty-nine
publicly traded companies received DPAs while there were only fifty-four convictions of
publicly traded companies. Data on file with Author.
43. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804, 1870; infra
notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 1794, 1871.
45. See generally Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach
to Banks by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A1 (discussing the rise of DPAs and
summarizing common criticisms of their use).
46. Lanny A. Breuer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the New York City Bar
Association (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2
012/crm-speech-1209131.html.
47. Id.
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particular, Breuer spoke at length of the dangers of potential collateral
consequences of conviction (i.e., the Andersen Effect) and, controversially,
lauded DPAs for giving the government leverage to obtain settlements in
situations where prosecutors previously had “faced a stark choice when
they encountered a corporation that had engaged in misconduct—either
indict, or walk away.”48
But while DPAs are in vogue at the DOJ, they have been fiercely
criticized elsewhere. In fact, the settlement leverage that Breuer praised is
extraordinarily controversial among academics and the corporate defense
bar. Professor Mike Koehler, a leading expert on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, responded to Breuer’s negative view of the “stark choice”
between indictment and declining to prosecute by stating:
There is absolutely, positively nothing wrong with this choice.
Bringing criminal charges against [a] person (natural or legal)
should not be easy. It should be difficult. Our founding fathers
recognized this as a necessary bulwark against an all powerful
government. There is no legal or policy reason warranting a
change from such a fundamental and long-lasting principle.49
Similarly, many other commentators accuse the DOJ of abusing its
prosecutorial discretion by conditioning DPAs on demands for expensive
compliance programs and, in particular, by requesting that corporations
waive their attorney–client privilege as part of the agreements so that the
DOJ may use privileged corporate documents to prosecute individual
corporate officers.50
Typically, these commentators argue that
corporations, fearful of the grave danger of being driven out of business
and suffering the same fate as Arthur Andersen, have no choice but to
buckle and agree to whatever demands the DOJ makes, no matter how
ruthless, unfair, or coercive.51 This argument is exemplified by a column

48. Id.
49. Mike Koehler, Assistant Attorney General Breuer’s Unconvincing Defense of
DPAs/NPAs, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/assistantattorney-general-breuers-unconvincing-defense-of-dpas-npas.
50. See Seigel, supra note 12, at 4–5 (detailing the corporate backlash against DPAs).
51. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 9, at 327 (“Because virtually no company will risk
indictment, prosecutors have come to expect compliance with every government demand.”);
Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1457 (“The legal and reputational vulnerabilities detailed above
make corporations uniquely weak negotiators in the criminal context. Since corporations
cannot run the risk of going to trial, their choice to accept a deferred prosecution agreement
is not really a choice at all.”); see also Weissmann & Newman, supra note 40, at 426
(stating after the Andersen case that “[c]orporate America could see both the resolve of the
government to prosecute even the largest of corporations, as well as the consequences that
could ensue from a company’s refusal to settle”).
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written in 2005 by former SEC Commissioner and famed Stanford Law
School professor Joseph Grundfest, who, in a claim rather ironically made
just several years prior to the infamous bailout of American International
Group, Inc., stated that “[i]f the government insists that A.I.G.’s chief
executive be fired as part of the price of not indicting the firm, the chief
executive is gone.”52
More recently, however, the DOJ has come under withering fire from
the opposite flank, from critics who argue that DPAs are nothing more than
ineffective sweetheart deals that do nothing to deter companies from
breaking the law by allowing criminal companies to get off with a slap on
the wrist. These critics typically argue that corporations should instead be
subject to indictment and conviction in order to maintain a strong deterrent
effect.53 This perspective, one that tracks many of the populist feelings
prevalent in the American consciousness today, is well-represented by the
writings of Randall Eliason, a former fraud prosecutor from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. As Mr. Eliason wrote of
the increased use of DPAs:
With the threat of criminal liability effectively off the table,
corporate executives may be more willing to skate aggressively
close to the line—or to jump over it. If the prospect of real
criminal sanctions against the company is removed, then
engaging in criminal activity becomes just another dollars-andcents decision. The moral condemnation aspect of a criminal
conviction is lost—and with it the unique deterrent value of
criminal law.54
This brand of criticism recently reached a new height in the aftermath of
the DOJ’s December 2012 announcement that it had entered into a $1.9
billion DPA with HSBC, the world’s third-largest publicly held bank.
HSBC stood accused of deliberately laundering billions of dollars in cash
for violent international drug cartels such as the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel
and the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, and of “violating U.S. sanctions
for years by illegally conducting transactions on behalf of customers in
Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan and Burma.”55 Yet, despite these horrendous

52. Grundfest, supra note 40.
53. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1795.
54. Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008; see also
Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1482–86 (2009) (arguing that corporations, as large, powerful actors, are more
than just legal fictions and should bear direct responsibility for their acts).
55. James O’Toole & Charles Riley, HSBC Pays $1.9 Billion to Settle U.S. Probe,
CNNMONEY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/10/news/companies/hsbc-
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allegations, the DOJ was content with entering into a DPA with HSBC,
with former Assistant Attorney General Breuer declaring that “HSBC is
being held accountable for stunning failures of oversight.”56
The response was immediate and scathing. A New York Times
editorial declared that it was “a dark day for the rule of law” and that “the
government has bought into the notion that too big to fail is too big to
jail.”57 Similarly, Professor William Black, a lead financial regulator
during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, noted that HSBC was “a
recidivist of epic proportions” and blasted the DOJ and other regulators for
“sham[ing] their institutions and professions, and betray[ing] their duty to
the nation and citizenry.”58 Other commentators were more restrained yet
still critical, noting that the DPA “raise[d] questions about whether such
deals constitute real punishment for large corporations and serve to deter
similar white-collar crime” and that the veracity of Breuer’s claims that
DPAs brought greater accountability for corporate wrongdoing was “far
from clear.”59
And thus the controversy has raged. Yet, it has not been accompanied
by any empirical attempt to determine whether the normal justifications
given for using DPAs are legitimate. The primary reason given for the use
of DPAs, of course, is the Andersen Effect. But no one has demonstrated
that convictions actually cause a significant number of business failures
among large corporations.60
In fact, some commentators have
acknowledged in passing that most convictions do not drive corporations
out of business.61 In other words, the national policy of preferring DPAs
money-laundering/.
56. Id.
57. Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38.
58. William K. Black, Why Did Obama and Cameron Save a Criminal Enterprise Like
HSBC?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-kblack/hsbc-settlement_b_2291859.html.
59. Alain Sherter, HSBC Bankers Dodge Personal Accountability, CBS MONEYWATCH
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57558734/hsbc-bankersdodge-personal-accountability/ (heavily citing an earlier version of this Article). Breuer
announced his resignation a month later, in January 2013, shortly after appearing in the
widely discussed Frontline documentary The Untouchables, in which he was critically
questioned about his approach to prosecuting “Wall Street” fraud in the aftermath of the
financial meltdown. Sarah Childress, Report: DOJ Criminal Chief Lanny Breuer Stepping
Down, FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/businesseconomy-financial-crisis/untouchables/report-doj-criminal-chief-lanny-breuer-steppingdown/.
60. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Seigel, supra note 12, at 18 (“The collapse of [Andersen] as a result of
being indicted was the exception, not the rule.”); Ball & Bolia, supra note 24, at 251
(acknowledging that “[n]o major corporation has been driven out of business by a

MARKOFF - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

MYTH OF THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY

5/10/2013 12:41 PM

811

over convictions is based on the fear of the Andersen Effect, but that fear is
supported by nothing more than inconsistent anecdotal evidence. No one
has ever checked to see if the Andersen Effect actually exists.
The second reason typically given for using DPAs is that DPAs can be
used to make companies implement compliance programs, cooperate with
individual prosecutions, and make other structural reforms. These benefits
are normally not available when corporations are convicted at trial since
they are not normal criminal penalties and typically may only be put in
place by consent. However, part and parcel with this lack of empirical
evidence for the Andersen Effect is the inconvenient fact that the oftenpresented dichotomy of “indictment vs. DPA” does not accurately reflect
the nuanced landscape of the corporate prosecution battlefield. The DOJ is
not dragging large corporations through epic, life-or-death trials;
indictments are actually quite rare, and more than ninety percent of
corporate convictions take place by plea agreement, just as they do in every
other kind of federal criminal prosecution.62 In fiscal year 2010, for
instance, 139 of the 145 organizations convicted in federal court were
convicted by plea agreement.63
In effect, the literature has been looking in the wrong place.
Indictments receive great attention, but only insofar as the demise of Arthur
Andersen is recited so often as to become a catechism. DPAs have been
extensively studied and debated in the literature.64 Yet, no one has checked
to see whether corporations that are convicted actually suffer business
failures, and, with the notable exception of Professor Garrett’s important
new work on the prosecution of foreign companies,65 no scholars have
studied corporate guilty plea agreements to see whether they can be used to
obtain the structural reform benefits of DPAs.66 This Article is meant to fill
government indictment since the Arthur Andersen case” (citing Joseph A. Grundfest, Over
Before it Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A23)).
62. See Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1801, 1801
n.102 (stating this fact and noting that by Sentencing Commission statistics, only nine
percent of convicted firms were convicted by trial verdict in the years 2000–2008).
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.53 (2010).
64. Compare Seigel, supra note 12, at 54 (arguing that prosecutors should be able to
demand that corporations waive the attorney–client privilege as a condition of DPAs, but
that additional protections should be added to protect individuals’ right against selfincrimination), with Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1457–62 (criticizing the “Specter of Abuse”
raised by the use of DPAs).
65. See generally Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11.
66. Cf. id. at 1801 (“We know little about corporate convictions and guilty pleas
generally . . . . [D]eferred and non-prosecution agreements have received scrutiny by
Congress, the GAO, the DOJ, judges, the Bar, scholars, and corporations. Corporate
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both of these voids.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Dataset Construction
To study the validity of the Andersen Effect and the structural benefits
of corporate guilty pleas, it was necessary to obtain a comprehensive list of
convicted companies. I began my research by creating a list of all publicly
traded companies convicted of a federal criminal offense in the years 2001
to 2010. This was accomplished by utilizing the extensive, privately
gathered collection of corporate plea agreements and docket sheets
assembled and generously made publicly available by Professor Brandon
Garrett of the University of Virginia School of Law.67 Although the U.S.
Sentencing Commission reports that a total of 1,897 organizations were
sentenced in the years 2001–2010,68 the Commission’s statistics are
incomplete, especially with regard to large corporations, and do not provide
the kind of detailed data I needed in order to perform the study.69 At the
time of the study, by contrast, Professor Garrett’s database held the federal
district court docket sheets for more than 1,700 federal criminal cases in
which corporations were convicted, along with hundreds of plea
agreements from those cases.70 Most importantly, the database was, and is,
nearly comprehensive with respect to the cases involving large, publicly
traded corporations convicted since 2000.71
Starting with the 1,408 docket sheets provided by Professor Garrett’s
collection for the years 2001–2010 (representing more than seventy-four
percent of the total organizational convictions for those years),72 I screened
convictions have not received such attention.”).
67. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807–08; Brandon
L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, U. VA. SCH. OF LAW
(last updated Oct. 10, 2011), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/home.php?
c=3&d=0.
68. This number may be arrived at by tabulating the annual statistics publicly released
in the USSC’s sourcebooks. Annual Reports & Sourcebooks Archives, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Archives.cfm (last visited Apr. 16,
2013).
69. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804–06.
70. By the time this Article was submitted for editing, the database had been expanded
to include the docket sheets for more than 1,900 criminal cases. Garrett & Ashley, supra
note 67.
71. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807–08.
72. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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out all convictions of corporations that were not publicly traded when
charged or convicted, defining a company as “publicly traded” if it had
made a filing with the SEC and, at the time of charging or conviction, was
traded on a major domestic or foreign stock exchange. Because my focus
was on large companies, I excluded companies that were only listed on
smaller exchanges like the NYSE MKT LLC (formerly called the
American Stock Exchange, or AMEX) or traded on unlisted markets like
the OTC Bulletin Board or Pink Sheets. The time of charging was defined
as the moment that a criminal information or indictment was filed against
the company in question, and the time of conviction as the moment a plea
agreement was filed or a guilty verdict rendered.73
I performed the initial screening of SEC filings by conducting
company name searches for each corporate defendant in the EDGAR
database, the SEC’s centralized tool for searching documents filed with the
SEC.74 Because all public companies on major domestic exchanges and
many companies on foreign exchanges have to make periodic SEC filings,
the EDGAR searches allowed me to find every company—with the
possible exception of some foreign companies that had never made any
filings with the SEC—that had ever been listed on a major stock exchange,
even if it later merged, changed its name, or went out of business. Of
course, because many companies are required to make SEC filings even if
they are not “public” as the term is colloquially used, the EDGAR searches
were highly overinclusive and turned up a large number of false positives.
For quality control, after each EDGAR search, I conducted additional,
secondary searches to determine whether the company in question was
traded on a major domestic or foreign stock exchange at the time of its
conviction. Generally, I performed secondary searches with tools like the
Bloomberg BusinessWeek website75 and Google searches targeted for the
appropriate time period. These secondary searches helped to exclude the
large number of false positives that initially appeared to be publicly traded
(such as private subsidiaries with names very similar to a publicly traded
73. Although I distinguished between the time of charging and the time of conviction,
it should be noted that the distinction is irrelevant in the vast majority of cases. Generally,
the government and the defendant arrange a plea agreement ahead of time and submit it
shortly after the charging information is filed. Ultimately, the distinction between time of
charging and time of conviction was not relevant to my study, as no company failed in the
intervening period.
74. Company Search, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searched
gar/companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
75. Public Company Search, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businesswe
ek.com/research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?region=ALL&letterIn=&search
Type=coname&x=0&y=0&lookuptype=public (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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parent company) and to catch the very small number of public companies,
generally foreign ones that did not file Forms 10K or 10Q, that were
overlooked in the initial EDGAR search. After I screened out all
companies that did not meet my criteria, there remained a list of all
publicly traded companies convicted during the ten-year period of 2001 to
2010.76 These data are represented in Figure 1 below.
B. Conviction Data and Fate After Conviction
After obtaining a list of publicly traded companies convicted in the
years 2001–2010, inclusive, I recorded their stock tickers and the
exchanges they were listed on at the time of conviction. Each company
was then coded by whether its primary listing was on a domestic or a
foreign exchange, and also coded as one of the following eight market
sectors:
Energy,77 Manufacturing,78 Food,79 Chemicals/Materials,80
Pharmaceuticals,81 Transportation,82 Defense,83 and Services.84 These

76. As discussed in the results, I obtained a lower final number of publicly traded
corporations than did either the U.S. Sentencing Commission or Professor Garrett. The
USSC reported sixty-three “openly traded” corporations for the years 2000–2009, nine more
than my finding of fifty-four for the years 2001–2010. Garrett, Globalized Corporate
Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807. I believe this discrepancy is because I excluded a
number of small public companies traded on minor stock exchanges like the old AMEX,
companies that likely would be included in the USSC’s dataset. In contrast, Professor
Garrett reported that 125 publicly traded corporations were convicted in the years 2000–
2009. The disparity between Professor Garrett’s findings and mine is due to our different
definitions of what constitutes a publicly traded corporation. Professor Garrett coded as
public all companies that made an SEC filing reported on the EDGAR database, while I
only deemed companies to be public if they made an SEC filing and were listed on a major
stock exchange at the time they were charged or convicted. Id. at 1807 n.129.
77. Companies in the Energy sector included utilities and all companies primarily
involved in natural resources exploitation, predominantly the exploitation of oil and natural
gas.
78. Companies in the Manufacturing sector included a variety of businesses primarily
involved in making products other than specialized chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or national
security products.
79. Companies in the Food sector included all those companies primarily involved in
the production, distribution, or retail of foodstuffs.
80. Companies in the Chemicals/Materials sector included those involved in the
refining of chemicals for purposes other than providing energy, as well as those companies
that produced raw materials such as steel or aluminum.
81. Companies in the Pharmaceuticals sector included those involved in the
production, marketing, and wholesale distribution of pharmaceutical drugs, medical devices,
and other products used for medicinal purposes.
82. Companies in the Transportation sector included those involved in the trucking,
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results are presented in Figure 2. Next, the type of criminal charge the
company pleaded to was coded as one of the following eight broad
categories:
Environmental/Food,85 Antitrust, False Statements/
86
Obstruction, Fraud,87 Pharma/Drug, FCPA, Export, and Terrorist
Transactions. For companies that pleaded guilty to multiple violations
from different categories, the violation was coded as the category that best
reflected the conduct being charged; for example, for BAE Systems’s plea
to FCPA violations and to making false statements, the charges were coded
as FCPA, which was the predominant offense with which the company was
charged.88 These data are presented in Figure 3.
For each conviction, the following information was recorded: the total
monetary penalty imposed (not counting special assessments), whether a
corporate monitor or a compliance plan was put in place as part of the plea
agreement, whether the corporation agreed to further cooperate with the
government, and whether any other penalties, such as community service
or a waiver of the attorney–client privilege, were imposed. Some of these
data are presented in Figure 5, and the rest are presented in the Appendix.
Most importantly, for each conviction, I determined whether the
corporate convict had suffered a business failure as a result of the
conviction. First, I determined whether each convicted corporation was
still listed under the same ticker on the same stock exchange that it had
been listed on at the time of its conviction. If it was, it was counted as
“Currently Active.” For those corporations that were no longer listed, I
determined what had happened to them and why. By using targeted
Internet searches and by reviewing SEC filings when necessary, I searched
for news and business articles that documented the time and nature of these
companies’ ultimate fates. For each company, I determined the class of
event (e.g., a merger or bankruptcy) that had caused it to delist from its
exchange. Next, I determined whether the event was a voluntary part of the

shipping, and air cargo industries.
83. Companies in the Defense sector included those primarily involved in
manufacturing national-security related products or providing security and logistical
services to the U.S. government overseas.
84. Companies in the Services sector included those primarily involved in providing
professional or entertainment services.
85. This broad category included pollution violations of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, violations of acts protecting certain plants and wildlife, violations of acts
banning adulterated foods, and other, related violations.
86. This category included not only false statements and obstruction of justice, but also
witness tampering and intimidation.
87. This category included all kinds of fraud, including securities fraud.
88. See infra app. A.
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corporation’s business and viewed as a positive, or whether the corporation
had been forced into the event by exigent circumstances. For those events
that were positives for the company, such as a merger in which the acquirer
bought out the old shares at a premium, the event was coded as a “Merger.”
For those where it appeared that the company’s acts were involuntary (such
as a hostile takeover), were voluntary but taken as a desperate move to save
the company’s business, or where the company simply went defunct, the
event was coded as a “Business Failure.” I then determined whether or not
the conviction could reasonably be said to have been an important factor in
the company’s failure.
Finally, for each company not coded as “Currently Active,” I
determined the length of time that had passed between the conviction and
the event that caused it to delist from its exchange, and noted all instances
where a Merger or Business Failure occurred within three years of the
conviction. These results, the heart of this Article, are presented in Figure
4.
C. Rationales
Performing an empirical study of corporate convictions is an
undertaking fraught with practical obstacles. Given the lack of official
tracking, there is no easily accessible, authoritative source of information
on corporate prosecutions or convictions. Official sources provide limited
data—the USSC’s sourcebooks, for example, provide little more than the
overall numbers of companies convicted each year.89 Privately collected
databases, by contrast, may be more detailed but are unlikely to be
comprehensive. Moreover, they are at the mercy of such uncontrollable
factors as whether the prosecutor who drafted the plea agreement clearly
outlined the plea’s terms or whether the district court clerk correctly
entered the corporate defendant’s name on the docket sheet. Furthermore,
the constantly shifting nature of the corporate entity is itself a barrier to
study. The nearly infinite variations of ownership structure, webs of
subsidiaries, waves of mergers, and nearly constant name changes that
ripple through the corporate ecosystem—much of which can be
surprisingly difficult to discern and decipher, even in the Internet era—all
combine to make tracking corporations over time an exasperating

89. E.g., 2010 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/SBTOC
10.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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endeavor, to say the least.
With these practical limitations in mind, I limited the scope of the
study to a particular subset of companies: those that were (i) publicly
traded and (ii) traded on a major stock exchange. I did this for several
reasons. First, as a matter of practicality, it was essential to limit the study
to companies about which a great deal of information is publicly available.
This is the case with publicly traded corporations, which are widely
followed in the popular press and are required to make numerous
disclosures to investors. In contrast, the actions of private companies can
be much more difficult to determine from publicly available information;
determining whether a private company that went out of business in 2004
did so as a result of a conviction in 2002 could be a difficult, if not
impossible, task.
Second, publicly traded companies disproportionately tend to be some
of the largest and most important companies in existence. Determining the
risk of putting them out of business is particularly important to making
effective policy.90 Third, publicly traded companies can more easily be
compared to one another, as they are similar in many respects. Public
domestic corporations, of course, are overwhelmingly incorporated in the
State of Delaware and are governed under Delaware corporate law. Most
importantly, their ownership, though it can be diffuse or concentrated in a
controlling shareholder that is its de facto owner, is not as variable as is the
ownership of private corporations, which can have a variety of forms, from
stand-alone companies owned by one or two individuals, to joint ventures
between other companies, to wholly owned subsidiaries.
Fourth, publicly traded companies may very likely be more easily
affected by a conviction than are private companies. Publicly traded
corporations are players in the equity markets, and their stock price is
extremely important to their health and survival. Their credit ratings and
loan covenants are often tied to stock price; a conviction that causes
investors to flee a publicly held corporation’s stock could theoretically
have devastating consequences to the corporation’s ability to obtain credit
and could indirectly cause a liquidity crisis. Private companies, by
contrast, are not subject to this type of pressure and, in the case of wholly
owned subsidiaries that can lean on their parent companies for funding,
could theoretically be completely immune to such effects.
The study was limited to companies traded on a major stock exchange,

90. Cf. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1805–06 (noting
that convictions of “larger, public firms” with larger fines are “the more significant cases of
the most interest to researchers”).
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excluding those traded on minor exchanges or on unlisted markets like the
OTC Bulletin Board, for similar reasons. The requirement of being traded
on a major exchange served as a rough proxy for company size and ensured
that every corporation in the study was at least large enough to maintain a
position on a major exchange. This avoided the potential sampling
problem of making an apples-to-oranges comparison between industry
giants and tiny companies with poorly regulated “over-the-counter”
securities.
Moreover, though small companies comprise the vast bulk of
convicted organizations,91 each individual small company has less of an
impact on the economy and society than does each individual large
company. Any business failure will have negative, often terrible effects on
the owners and employees of that business, but the failure of a small
company would not shake the entire nation as would the failure of, say, an
ExxonMobil.92 Furthermore, small companies often may be mere shells
that use the corporate form to disguise a purely criminal enterprise.93 The
failure of such a shell operation should be seen as a social benefit or, at the
very least, it should not be seen as a negative. By contrast, the failure of a
large company can have enormous effects, and those that are convicted,
even those that have committed horrendous crimes, are almost always
legitimate businesses. Limiting the scope to companies traded on major
exchanges allowed this study to focus on the companies that
proportionately have the most impact on society and thus are of the most
interest to policymakers.
III. RESULTS
A. Types of Companies and Charges
Using the methodology described in the preceding Part, I obtained a
list of fifty-four (54) separate federal convictions of publicly traded
companies from the years 2001–2010.94 All were convicted by guilty plea,
and indictments were only filed in two cases. The majority of the

91. Id. at 1804–05.
92. I use ExxonMobil Corp. as an example only because that company was indeed
convicted in the year 2009. See infra app A.
93. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804–05.
94. Two companies, ICN Pharmaceuticals and Eli Lilly, were each convicted on two
separate occasions. I count each instance separately to arrive at the total of fifty-four
convictions.
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companies (34) were domestic, with a primary stock listing on either the
NYSE or NASDAQ. The remaining twenty companies were primarily
listed on major foreign stock exchanges, most of which were located in
Asia or Western Europe.95 These data are presented in Figure 1 on the next
page and in the Appendices. A wide variety of market sectors and
industries were represented by the companies convicted. The most
common sector was Manufacturing (13), followed by Food (8),
Pharmaceuticals (7), Transportation (7), and Chemicals/Materials(7). Less
common were the Energy (5), Defense (4), and Services (3) sectors.
Conspicuously absent from the list were any banks or companies in the
financial services sector. These data are represented in Figure 2, on the
next page.

95. The total list of stock exchanges represented in this study were the NYSE,
NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Euronext, London Stock
Exchange, Korean Stock Exchange, Australian Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange,
and Hong Kong Stock Exchange. See infra fig.1.
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Figure 1. Companies Listed by Stock Exchange (n =
54)

NYSE (27)
NASDAQ (7)
Tokyo SE (5)
Frankfurt SE (3)
Euronext (3)
London SE (3)
Korean SE (3)
Hong Kong SE (1)
Australian SE (1)
Toronto SE (1)

Figure 2. Market Sector of Publicly Traded
Companies Convicted 2001 - 2010 (n = 54)
Manufacturing (13)
Food (8)
Pharmaceuticals (7)
Transportation (7)
Chemicals/Materials (7)
Energy (5)
Defense (4)
Services (3)

The predominant types of offenses were Environmental/Food Safety
(19) and Antitrust (16).
Other common offenses were False
Statements/Obstruction (6), Pharma/Drug (4), and FCPA (4). Fraud (2),
Export (2), and Terrorist Transactions (1) were also represented. The most
notable absences from the list were those involving fraud and financial
crimes, as only one instance of securities fraud was found.96 These data are
represented in Figure 3.

96. See infra app. A.
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Figure 3. Primary Criminal Charges Pleaded to by
Publicly Traded Corporations 2001 - 2010 (n = 54)
Environmental/Food Safety
(19)
Antitrust (16)
False
Statements/Obstruction (6)
Pharma/Drug (4)
FCPA (4)
Fraud (2)

B. Company Fates
Of the fifty-four publicly traded companies convicted in the years
2001–2010, a large majority (37) are currently active, that is, they are listed
on the same stock exchange that they were listed on at the time of their
conviction, and they have not undergone a merger, acquisition, or name
change. These data are shown in Figure 4. A smaller but still significant
number (17) are no longer active on their original stock exchange under
their original name, or are currently active under that name but only after
suffering a business failure and reorganizing. Of those seventeen
companies, twelve merged with or were acquired by another company
under favorable circumstances that did not implicate a business failure.
These were ICN Pharmaceuticals,97 MacDermid,98 OMI Corp.,99 Crompton

97. As noted above, ICN was convicted twice, and for consistency is counted as two
separate convictions. ICN changed its name in 2003 to Valeant Pharmaceuticals. See
Ronald D. White, What’s in a Name Change? A New Image, ICN Hopes, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2003, at B1 (discussing how ICN changed its name to Valeant Pharmaceuticals in order
to escape a tarnished image). Valeant was acquired in 2010 in a transaction valued at $3.3
billion. Pav Jordan & Esha Dey, Drugmaker Biovail to Buy Valeant in $3.3 Billion Deal,
REUTERS (June 21, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/21/us-biovailvaleant-idUSTRE65K1LA20100621.
98. MacDermid was acquired in 2006 in a transaction valued at $1.3 billion, and
shareholders received a premium on their shares. MacDermid Incorporated Announces
Signing of Merger Agreement, BUSINESS WIRE NEWS RELEASE (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.
wnd.com/markets/news/read/797311/macdermid_incorporated_announces_signing_of_mer
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Corp.,100 Titan Corp.,101 XTO Energy,102 Cephalon,103 Herley Industries,104
Rhodia,105 Hynix Semiconductors,106 and British Airways.107

ger_agreement.
99. OMI Corp. was acquired in 2007 in a transaction valued at $2.2 billion. OMI Corp
to Be Acquired by Teekay and TRMD for $29.95 per Share, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2007, 5:03
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/17/idUSIN20070417170349OMM20070417.
100. Crompton Corporation acquired and merged with Great Lake Chemical
Corporation in 2005 (subsequently changing its name to Chemtura) in a deal that was
apparently very favorable for investors. Crompton and Great Lakes Merge, ICIS.COM (Mar.
14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2005/03/11/659739/crompton-andgreat-lakes-merge.html. The new company was led by Crompton’s old board. Crompton
Corporation and Great Lakes Chemical Corporation Announce Merger to Create Major
New Specialty Chemicals Company, CHEMTURA (Mar. 9, 2005, 6:20 AM),
http://investor.chemtura.com/press-release/great-lakes-historical/crompton-corporation-andgreat-lakes-chemical-corporation-annou.
101. Titan Corp. was acquired by L-3 Communications in June 2005, three months after
being convicted of FCPA violations and paying a $28.5 million fine. See infra app. B.
News reports celebrated Titan’s record revenues and stated that an earlier merger deal had
fallen through because of the then-unresolved charges. L-3 Communications Acquires
Titan, DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (June 8, 2005, 8:21 AM), http://www.defenseindustrydai
ly.com/l3-communications-acquires-titan-0663/. The deal was valued at $2.65 billion. Id.
102. XTO Energy was acquired by ExxonMobil Corp. in 2010 in a deal valued at $41
billion. Michael J. de la Merced, Exxon Mobil to Buy XTO Energy for $31 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 14, 2009, 8:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/
exxonmobil-to-buy-xto-energy-for-41-billion/.
103. Cephalon was acquired by Teva Pharmaceuticals in 2011 in a deal valued at $6.2
billion. Naomi Kresge & Robert Langreth, Teva Bets on Stem Cells, Cancer in $6.2 Billion
Bid for Cephalon, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/n
ews/2011-05-02/teva-to-acquire-cephalon-for-81-50-per-share-in-cash.html.
104. Herley Industries was acquired in 2011 by Kratos Defense and Security Solutions
in a deal worth $270 million. Kratos Acquiring Herley Industries, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Feb
8, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/
02/08/Kratos-acquiring-Herley-Industries/UPI-45991297164637/.
105. Rhodia was acquired by the Solvay Group in 2011 in a deal valued at €6.6 billion.
Will Beacham, Solvay Merger with Rhodia to Create Global Leader in Polymers and
Consumer Products, ICIS: LOOK EAST FOR CHEMICALS (Apr. 4, 2011, 10:11 AM), http://
www.icis.com/blogs/east-european-chemicals/2011/04/solvay-merger-with-rhodia-tocreate-global-leader-in-polymers-and-consumer-products.html.
106. Hynix was partially bought out and merged with the South Korean conglomerate
SK Telecom in 2011, in a deal valued at $3.1 billion. Jun Yang & Seonjin Cha, SK Telecom
will Acquire 21% Stake in Hynix Semiconductor for $3.05 billion, BLOOMBERG (Nov 14,
2011, 4:32 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-14/sk-telecom-will-acquire-21stake-in-hynix-semiconductor-for-3-05-billion.html.
107. British Airways merged with the Spanish airline Iberia in 2011. British Airways
trades for Last Time Ahead of Iberia Merger, GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 20, 2011, 3:26
PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/20/british-airways-trades-last-timemerger.
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Figure 4. Company Fate After Conviction (n = 54)
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Thus, forty-nine of the fifty-four companies convicted in the years
2001–2010 are either currently active or are no longer active under their
original name because of favorable mergers or acquisitions. But, in
contrast to these ultimately successful companies, five companies suffered
fates that could reasonably be described as business failures. These
companies were Utilicorp United, Winn-Dixie Stores, Elpida Memory,
Energy Partners, Ltd., and Japan Airlines International.108 Of these five
companies, three filed for bankruptcy, while two were ultimately acquired
by another company under conditions that could arguably be said to
represent a business failure. However, none of the companies could
reasonably be said to have suffered a business failure because of their
convictions.
First off, three of the business failures—those of Utilicorp United,
Winn-Dixie Stores, and Elpida Memory—occurred more than three years
after the companies were convicted.109 This fact alone makes it extremely
unlikely that the failures were caused by or related to the convictions. This
conclusion is supported by contemporary accounts. Utilicorp, a formerly
high-flying utility and energy trader that had copied many of Enron’s shady
methods, went into decline after the Enron scandal made its business highly
suspect; its ultimate unfavorable acquisition in 2007 by another utility
company had everything to do with the fact that investors thought the
business shady, and nothing to do with the fact that it received a

108. See infra app. B.
109. See infra app. B.
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$1,000,000 penalty for an environmental offense six years before.110
Likewise, Winn-Dixie was already in bankruptcy when it was convicted of
an environmental offense, and it successfully reorganized several months
afterwards; it was eventually bought out in 2011 after struggling to avoid a
second bankruptcy.111 If the conviction were to have caused the failure,
one would have expected the company to have never emerged from its first
bankruptcy and to have gone straight into liquidation. Similarly, while
Elpida Memory, a Japanese semiconductor manufacturer, received an $84
million antitrust fine in March 2006, that conviction had little to do with its
ultimate bankruptcy in February 2012, which occurred after a global
downturn in the PC memory market made its core business and debt levels
unsustainable.112
Contemporary accounts also show that the same is true for the two
companies that went out of business within three years of being convicted.
Japan Airlines International (JAL), the flag airline of Japan, filed for
reorganization bankruptcy in January 2010, more than a year and a half
after it pleaded guilty to an antitrust violation and paid a $110 million
fine.113 While this fine was indeed quite large, it pales in comparison to the

110. See infra apps. A, B. Utilicorp United changed its name to Aquila shortly after the
Enron scandal. Utilicorp Changes Name to Aquila, Inc. Begins Trading Under Symbol ILA,
GREAT PLAINS ENERGY (Mar. 18, 2002), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml
?c=96211&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1201210&highlight=. It later was acquired by Great
Plains Energy. Aquila Inc. Finally Sold After 5-Year Struggle, PIPELINE & GAS J., Mar.
2007, at 2 (“The sale culminates Aquila’s stunning downfall. Once ranked No. 33 on the
Fortune 500 list of the nation’s largest companies, Aquila was a victim of the energy trading
debacle that occurred around the same [time] that Enron Corp. collapsed. Aquila lost
billions of dollars in trading and in other unregulated businesses.”); Lisa Lee, Great Plains
Energy to buy Aquila for $1.7 bln, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2007, 1:58 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/07/businesspro-aquila-takeover-dcidUSN0737190420070207 (noting that investors were unhappy and opposed the merger
because they were being bought out at a discount, an amount at less than what their shares
were trading at on the open market).
111. Winn-Dixie entered bankruptcy in February 2005, was convicted in April 2006,
and successfully reorganized in November 2006. John Dobosz, Winn-Dixie: The Beef
People at a Bargain, FORBES: STOCK OF THE WEEK (Feb. 4, 2010, 1:50 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/04/winn-dixie-publix-personal-finance-investing-ideassupervalu-grocery.html; infra app. A. It was then bought out in late 2011 after continued
brushes with going out of business. Winn Dixie Still Struggles, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 17,
2011),
http://www.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/2011/Winn-Dixie-Still-StrugglesWINN-KR-SVU-WMT0217.aspx#axzz1t05NwdC5; Mihir Dalal, Winn-Dixie to go private
in $560 mln Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2
011/12/19/winndixiestores-biloidUSL3E7NJ4BA20111219.
112. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japanese Computer Chip Maker Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at B4.
113. Japan Airlines Files for Bankruptcy Protection, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:57
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$25 billion of debt it owned at the time it filed for bankruptcy.114
Moreover, news articles at the time blamed JAL’s failure on market
conditions such as rising fuel prices, declining passenger volume, and
increased competition from rival airlines, but did not mention the
conviction.115 JAL was the victim of the global economy and its own
financial problems. It was not driven out of business by its conviction.
The only domestic company to suffer a business failure within three
years of conviction was Energy Partners, Ltd. (EPL), a New Orleans-based
energy company traded on the NYSE. EPL was convicted of a minor
environmental offense in February 2008 and sentenced to pay a $75,000
fine along with an additional $25,000 community service penalty.116 A
year later, after suffering financial troubles, it was delisted from the NYSE,
and in May 2009, with its business “struggl[ing] with deteriorating
commodity prices and lengthy hurricane shutdowns,” it filed for chapter 11
reorganization bankruptcy.117 The company, which suffered losses of
between $40 and $50 million in 2008, blamed its financial troubles on “a
combination of lower oil and natural gas prices and anticipated reduced
capital spending based on the lower commodity price environment.”118 As
reported at the time, the President of the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association
supported this assessment by stating that EPL’s “predicament is an extreme
version of a situation many energy companies are facing in Louisiana and
across the nation.”119 Like Elpida and JAL, EPL was driven to failure by
its own debt load and the global economic collapse. There is no plausible
reason to suspect that a minor environmental conviction was the straw that
broke the company’s back.

AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8466997.stm; infra app. B.
114. Mayumi Negishi & Mariko Katsumura, Japan Airlines Files for $25 Billion
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19
/us-jal-idUSTRE60H4NA20100119.
115. Id.; Japan Airlines Files for Bankruptcy Protection, supra note 113.
116. See infra app. B (showing a total of $100,000 in penalties for EPL).
117. Kimberly Quillen, Energy Partners Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans) (May 1, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/200
9/05/energy_partners_files_chapter.html; Jen DeGregorio, Energy Partners to Be Delisted
from New York Stock Exchange, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Mar. 25, 2009, 5:23 PM),
http://blog.nola.com/tpmoney/2009/03/energy_partners_to_be_delisted.html.
118. DeGregorio, supra note 117.
119. Id.
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C. Plea Characteristics
The fifty-four convictions in this sample reveal a wealth of data on
corporation plea agreements, the most important of which are presented in
Figure 5. The total monetary penalties attached to a conviction ranged
from a diminutive $20,000 environmental fine on XTO Energy to an
enormous $1.615 billion total penalty on Eli Lilly for distributing and
advertising misbranded pharmaceuticals.120 Of the fifty-four convictions in
this study, forty-three involved a monetary penalty greater than $1 million,
twenty-eight involved a penalty greater than $10 million, and thirteen
involved a penalty greater than $100 million.
More importantly, many of the convictions in this study contained
agreements to implement the kinds of structural reforms that are usually
thought of as only being obtainable through the use of DPAs. While plea
agreements were only available for thirty-four of the fifty-four convictions,
the agreements that were available, when combined with the courts’ docket
sheets, allow for a partial picture of what may be achieved with plea
agreements.

Figure 5. Plea Agreement Characteristics (n = 54)
50
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120. See infra app. B (detailing the range of plea penalties for public companies
convicted in the years 2001–2010).
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One-third (18) of the guilty pleas contained agreements that the
defendant corporation would fully and completely cooperate with the
government’s investigation into other aspects of the defendant’s business,
with parallel civil litigation, or in prosecutions of individual corporate
officers. Nearly one-quarter (13) also contained compliance programs,
most of which were extremely detailed in the same fashion as are
compliance plans put in place through DPAs. Additionally, several (4)
guilty pleas required the defendant corporations to hire corporate monitors
to conduct independent oversight of their businesses. Finally, one plea
agreement required a defendant to make a partial waiver of its attorney–
client privilege121 and one plea agreement required the defendant to
perform community service.
D. Implications: No Evidence of an Andersen Effect
No public company convicted in the years 2001–2010 went out of
business because of a federal criminal conviction. This result calls the
conventional wisdom about the Andersen Effect into serious doubt. If it
were true that “prosecution alone [can] destroy even the most established of
companies,” then at least some of the public companies convicted in the
years 2001–2010 should have gone out of business following their
convictions.122 Yet none of them did.
What explains this result? Several possible explanations come to
mind. First and most obviously, the destruction of a company by a
conviction could be the exception rather than the rule. Second, it could be
possible that it is the uncertainty of indictment and possible conviction at
trial, rather than the mere fact of a conviction negotiated by plea
agreement, that destroys companies. It is logical to assume that, because
cooperation can allow defendants to negotiate for lower penalties,
companies convicted by plea agreement would have a better chance of
survival than companies convicted at trial. Third, it could simply be that
the DOJ is only prosecuting companies that are “healthy” enough to
survive a conviction. All of these explanations are at least plausible,
though none are completely satisfactory.
The first explanation, which I believe is the most likely to be true, is
that the Andersen Effect, that is, the possibility of driving a company out of

121. The privilege waiver was required in the case of Chiquita Brands International,
which, in March 2007, was convicted of transacting with terrorist groups. Infra apps. A, B.
122. Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1436.
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business through the collateral consequences of prosecution, is generally
not a threat to most large public companies. Only five of the companies in
this study went out of business, and none of them did so under
circumstances that could plausibly be connected to their convictions.123
This is not to say, of course, that convictions can never cause established
companies to fail. Arthur Andersen itself would appear to be proof of that
possibility, though it should be remembered that Andersen was a
professional services partnership and thus subject to different stresses than
are most public companies. And it is certainly possible—or even certain—
that there are many small, private companies that suffered business failures
but fell outside this study’s criteria. Even if most companies would not be
threatened by most convictions, the mere fact that the companies in this
study survived does not foreclose the possibility that some companies
could be placed at risk of going out of business because of a conviction.
Those caveats aside, the fact remains that the complete absence of
conviction-related failures strongly supports the conclusion that the
Andersen Effect does not exist.
The second possible explanation is that it is indictment and conviction
by jury verdict that is deadly to the corporate defendant, rather than mere
conviction by guilty plea. As noted, more than ninety percent of
convictions of organizations in the federal system happen through guilty
plea,124 but Andersen was convicted at trial. It is not implausible that the
Andersen Effect might be limited to convictions obtained by indictment
and guilty verdict. My data are inconclusive on this point. As discussed,
all fifty-four convictions in this study occurred by plea agreement, while
only two of the companies were initially charged by indictment.
Interestingly, neither of those two companies (Overseas Shipholding Group
and Herley Industries) was among the five companies that suffered
business failures.125 But even if it is the rare indictment and conviction by
guilty verdict that is the true corporation-killer, the sheer rarity of
indictment and trial still leaves the Andersen Effect as the exception and
not the rule. Most convictions will still occur by plea agreement and will
not give prosecutors or policymakers cause for concern.
The third possible explanation could be that prosecutions are
occurring selectively for fear of the Andersen Effect or for some other
reason. As already noted, the original Holder Memo stated that prosecutors

123. See supra section III.B.
124. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
125. See infra app. B (reporting that Overseas Shipholding Group is still active and
Herley Industries has merged with another corporation).
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should consider potential collateral consequences in making charging
decisions.126 Moreover, in his recent remarks, former Assistant Attorney
General Breuer went to great lengths to explain how the DOJ takes
potential collateral consequences into account when it makes charging
decisions.127 Furthermore, the current literature suggests that prosecutors
target certain market sectors for prosecution and others for DPAs, and my
data add some additional support to that conclusion.128 Of the companies in
my dataset, nearly all were firms like chemical companies, manufacturing
companies, and shipping companies—all companies that make or utilize
tangible products and materials. By contrast, firms that provided intangible
services such as investment banking were entirely absent from the list of
convicted companies.129 In fact, no public companies involved in the
financial sector were convicted in the years 2001–2010, a result that is
particularly provocative in light of the current controversy over the
government’s failure to aggressively prosecute firms and individuals
involved in the recent financial crisis.130 Likewise, thirty-five of the fiftyfour convictions in my dataset were for environmental and antitrust
offenses, respectively, but only two convictions were for offenses involving
fraud.
126. Holder Memo, supra note 25.
127. See Breuer, supra note 46 (explaining how the DOJ considers the effects of a
charge on innocent employees, shareholders, the health of a particular industry, and the
market as a whole).
128. Notably, Professor Garrett found that foreign companies, which were mainly large
firms, were primarily being convicted of antitrust and environmental violations, while firms
being targeted for fraud violations received a disproportionate number of DPAs. Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1874–76 figs.4–6.
129. See infra app. A (showing that the list of convicted companies does not include any
that provide such services).
130. See infra apps. A, B (reporting that companies in the financial sector are not on the
list of convicted companies). Many commentators, particularly those in the popular press,
have castigated the government’s failure to prosecute “Wall Street.” See, e.g., William
Greider, How Wall Street Crooks Get out of Jail Free, THE NATION, Apr. 11, 2011, at 11–14
(describing the government’s unwillingness to prosecute Wall Street following the financial
crisis as a conflict of values where corporate capitalism has defeated society’s sense of right
and wrong); Morgenson & Story, supra note 45 (noting that prosecutors have largely ceased
prosecuting financial firms in favor of using DPAs); Alex Pareene, No One Went to Jail, so
Why is Wall Street So Mad?, SALON (May 7, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/
05/07/no_one_went_to_jail_so_why_is_wall_street_so_mad/ (arguing that President
Obama’s inaction has only emboldened those individuals involved in the financial crisis
because they have faced no legal repercussions); Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?,
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/whyisnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (providing details about a variety of cases against Wall
Street firms that did not result in any convictions and characterizing the SEC as ineffective
and corrupt).

MARKOFF - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

830

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/10/2013 12:41 PM

[Vol. 15:3

Thus, it is possible that prosecutors may be selectively prosecuting
companies that they believe can stand the shock of conviction while they
are entering into DPAs with companies that they fear would fail if
convicted. Unfortunately, the evidence neither supports nor casts doubt on
this explanation. While the data show that prosecutors disproportionately
pursue convictions for some offenses while they instead pursue DPAs for
others, the data alone cannot tell us why prosecutors are taking these
actions. And even if the DOJ is declining to prosecute companies for fear
of the Andersen Effect, there is no evidence that its fear is justified or that
the companies ultimately convicted are any healthier than those that receive
DPAs. While a future article could further explore this possibility, perhaps
by comparing the market fundamentals of convicted companies to the
fundamentals of companies that receive DPAs, the current evidence is
inconclusive on this point.
Though the possibility that the DOJ is preempting the Andersen Effect
by pursuing DPAs when companies are at risk cannot be entirely
discounted, there is no data to support it either. One clear result remains:
No company publicly traded on a major stock exchange failed because of a
conviction that occurred in the years 2001-2010. There is no empirical
evidence to support the existence of the Andersen Effect.
E. Implications: Structural Reforms May Be Obtained Through
Convictions
Additionally, as part of their plea bargains, many convicted companies
in this study agreed to the exact types of detailed compliance programs and
structural reforms that DPAs often implement.
Of the fifty-four
convictions, thirteen involved the implementation of a compliance program
while four involved the implementation of a corporate monitor.131 Of these,
all of the convictions that implemented corporate monitors and ten of the
thirteen convictions implementing compliance programs came after the
year 2006, likely indicating that the DOJ only recently began to regularly
use plea agreements to obtain such reforms.132
These results call into question the necessity of using DPAs as a
means to impose compliance programs and corporate monitors on lawbreaking companies. Guilty pleas can and increasingly are being used to
obtain the implementation of the types of structural reforms often thought

131. See infra app. B.
132. See infra apps. A, B.
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of as being exclusive to DPAs.
IV. OUTLINING A “CORE BUSINESS MODEL” OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
The data presented above do not prove that companies never go out of
business because of convictions, but they indisputably show that the
conventional wisdom is more than misguided: It is simply wrong.
Prosecution may drive large companies out of business in some rare
situations, but it is not the “corporate death penalty” that ideological
hyperbole has made it out to be. In fact, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, prosecutors, defense counsel, and policymakers should assume
that convictions will only cause large companies to suffer business failures
in extraordinary situations.
Of course, even though it is the rare situation where a prosecution
dooms a company, the consequences of such a failure, if it occurs, may
very well be disastrous. Like the doctor who needs to know when a
particular patient is predisposed towards heart disease, prosecutors and
policymakers need to know when a particular corporation is at risk of
failing if prosecuted. The remainder of this Article briefly describes a new
model for predicting when convictions are likely to destroy corporations,
and it explains what new steps should be taken in light of this model.
I hypothesize that, in the overwhelming majority of situations, a
conviction will only cause a corporation to go out of business when it
threatens the corporation’s ability to conduct its core business. As a
starting point for this model, I draw on one of the tenets of rational choice
theory. Namely, I assume that the markets and most of the major players in
those markets are, on the whole, economically rational actors that act in
their own financial self-interest. This assumption is critical because it
provides a basis for determining, in any given situation, how and why a
company might go out of business. While many commentators point
towards reputational damage, disbarment, and other collateral
consequences of conviction, there is little broader effort to understand the
causal chain of events that leads from conviction to business failure.
With that assumption in mind, I next divide the possible consequences
of conviction into two broad categories: acute harms and structural harms.
Acute harms are those that will have short-term consequences but are oneoff events that, if survived, do not implicate the corporation’s long-term
chance of survival. Typical examples of such harms would be most
monetary penalties, damaged credit ratings, and general reputational
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damage. These harms can be very damaging, for sure, and can cause
decreased revenues or conceivably even trigger liquidity crises in certain
circumstances. Yet, in most situations, they do not cast doubt upon a large
corporation’s chance of survival. Structural harms, by contrast, are those
which are both long-lasting and which make the corporation unable or less
able to produce or market its core products and services. These harms
could appear in a variety of forms, but all follow a pattern: Where the
conviction would eliminate the demand for the corporation’s products or
services in a marketplace of economically rational actors or eliminate the
corporation’s ability to provide those products or services, a structural harm
will occur and the corporation’s viability will be threatened.
Consider two hypothetical examples: Greedy Corporation and Evil
Corporation.133 Greedy Corporation, a large manufacturer of components
used in widget production, pleads guilty to antitrust violations for fixing the
prices of its widget components, is fined $1 billion, and is forced to appoint
a corporate monitor and begin an expensive, intrusive compliance program.
Greedy has to revise its future earnings expectations downwards, and its
credit rating is cut to near-junk status. Greedy has suffered only acute
harms; while its profitability and ability to obtain credit has decreased, its
core business has not been impacted. Greedy can still make its widget
components, and the widget-makers will still buy them in order to build
their widgets. Any reputational harm to Greedy will be largely irrelevant;
the companies that purchase its products may be displeased upon learning
that they had been swindled in the past, but they still need to make widgets,
and Greedy’s crime does not call into question its ability to make desirable
widget components. In the absence of some other problem, Greedy will
survive.
Evil Corporation, by contrast, is a large defense contractor that is
convicted of committing arms export violations. While it is a multibilliondollar business, nearly half of its revenue comes from its main customer,
the federal government. Upon its conviction, the government excludes Evil
from all government contracts for the indefinite future. The conviction has
thus caused a lasting decrease in the demand for Evil’s products in the
marketplace, and Evil has thus suffered a severe structural harm. Investors
will likely desert it, and its business may be likely to fail.
The existing evidence supports the Core Business Model that I
propose. Most of the companies in the dataset suffered severe acute harms
as a result of their convictions, but did not suffer structural harms. Eli
Lilly, the pharmaceuticals giant, pleaded guilty in 2009 to selling

133. With apologies to Professor Jens Dammann.
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misbranded drugs, agreed to pay $1.65 billion in criminal fines and civil
settlements, and agreed to a compliance plan.134 These harms were all
acute harms, however, and because Eli Lilly was not excluded from
participation in government health programs, it continued to produce and
sell pharmaceutical products. Eli Lilly is still in business today. This
makes perfect sense. Few economically rational actors would stop
prescribing or purchasing drugs for legitimate, necessary uses simply
because the drugs had previously been misbranded. Doctors and customers
might trust Eli Lilly less or potentially treat the company with moral
opprobrium, but that would not stop more than an insignificant number of
them from prescribing and consuming its drugs.
Likewise, Chiquita Brands International, the large produce company,
pleaded guilty in 2007 to transacting with designated Colombian terrorist
groups.135 One might assume that “palling around with terrorists” in such a
manner would be an unforgiveable sin these days, but that assumption
would be mistaken. Chiquita’s conviction caused it no structural harms, as
it did not affect Chiquita’s ability to make and deliver produce to its
customers, and any reputational damage it may have suffered did not cause
it structural harm. In the absence of a widespread boycott based on moral
outrage, no economically rational retailer would stop buying Chiquita’s
bananas regardless of what atrocities the corporation contributed to in
South America.
An even more potent example of this principle can be found in the
recent conviction of the multinational energy giant, BP. In November
2012, BP pleaded guilty for its conduct in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
to eleven counts of felony manslaughter, one count of felony obstruction of
Congress, and violations of the Clean Water Act and Migratory Bird Treaty
Act.136 As part of its plea, BP—a company that had previously been
convicted several times, including for an explosion at its Texas City
refinery in 2005 that killed fifteen workers—was sentenced to pay a record
$4 billion in criminal penalties.137 Yet, BP was not banned from drilling on
public lands and only received a temporary suspension from receiving

134. See infra apps. A, B.
135. See infra apps. A, B.
136. Press Release, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to
Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding
Deepwater Horizon Incident, U.S. DEP’T OF Justice (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html.
137. Abrahm Lustgarten, A Stain That Won’t Wash Away, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at
A23.
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government contracts, and thus it suffered no structural harms.138 As the
Core Business Model would predict, its stock price barely moved, and the
company remains hugely profitable, much to the distress of the many who
advocated that the company receive a far more severe sanction for the
criminal negligence that caused the largest environmental catastrophe in
U.S. history.139
By contrast, Utilicorp United was forced into an unfavorable merger
because of weakness in its core energy trading business, a weakness that
arose from its investors’ fundamental distrust of the energy trading model
that Utilicorp used.140 This weakness (though unrelated to its conviction)
caused Utilicorp structural harm by preventing it from being able to
successfully monetize that sector of its business, and it ultimately drove the
company to seek an unfavorable merger.
The fate of Arthur Andersen itself fits well in the Core Business
Model. The fall of Enron and Andersen’s subsequent indictment and
conviction caused an enormous structural harm to Andersen by destroying
the value of its product. Andersen, one of the “big five” accounting firms,
was a hugely prestigious organization. Its core product was not simply
accounting services; rather, it was the trustworthiness of its name.
Andersen’s clients utilized its services as a way to tell the government and
their own creditors and investors that their books were overseen by a
trustworthy, highly reputable accountant. That trustworthiness was exactly
what was destroyed by the Enron scandal and Andersen’s conviction. With
its reputation shattered, Andersen had no product to offer.
CONCLUSION
Using the Core Business Model as a starting point, both the DOJ and
corporate defense counsel should change their respective strategies. The
DOJ in particular should radically revamp its much criticized program of
using DPAs by increasing its willingness to demand guilty pleas of
corporate defendants, and, if necessary, issuing indictments and taking

138. Roberta Rampton & Timothy Gardner, U.S. Bans BP From New Government
Contracts After Oil Spill Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/11/28/us-bp-contracts-idUSBRE8AR0M120121128.
139. See, e.g., Tyson Slocum, Public Citizen’s Take on BP Settlement, CITIZENVOX
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.citizenvox.org/2012/11/15/public-citizen-bp-settlement/
(attacking the criminal plea as “pathetic” and “inadequate to address BP’s repeated criminal
conduct”).
140. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
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defendants to trial. By basing its actions on the knowledge that most
corporations will not go out of business if convicted and by using the core
business model to predict which corporations might be at risk, the DOJ can
confidently prosecute more companies without fear of creating another
Andersen-style collapse. The DOJ should continue to use DPAs only in
those instances where the Core Business Model predicts that a prosecution
might actually threaten a company’s survival.
Such a shift towards increased prosecutions and away from DPAs
would both increase deterrence of corporate wrongdoing and further the
interests of justice. The data show that the two main reasons for using
DPAs—the Andersen Effect and the supposed inability to gain compliance
programs and structural reforms through guilty pleas—are largely invalid.
The Core Business Model can be used to help predict those rare situations
where business failures may occur, and the data show that plea agreements
can be used to obtain structural reforms just as successfully as DPAs can.
With this new information, there is little justification for using DPAs in
most cases. Prosecutors should seek convictions when they can, use DPAs
only when they absolutely must, and decline to prosecute when they have a
weak case that can only be successfully prosecuted by improperly
pressuring a defendant. By adopting these methods, the DOJ can both
increase deterrence of corporate crime and operate in a manner that is more
transparent and more respectful of defendants’ rights.141
Likewise, defense counsel should recognize that the effects of
corporate convictions are widely overstated—particularly given the
government’s apparent reluctance to bar convicted companies from
government contracts—and that the Core Business Model can be used to
help predict which offenses a defendant can safely plead to. Though a
141. In the time since this Article was submitted for editing, there has been some
indication that a shift in the direction I recommend may, in fact, be beginning. In the weeks
after the DOJ announced the now-infamous HSBC DPA, it finalized guilty plea agreements
with the Japanese subsidiaries of two banks, UBS and the Royal Bank of Scotland, as part of
larger settlements (complete with DPAs for the parent companies) of those companies’
involvement in the LIBOR interest-rate rigging scandal. Ben Protess, Prosecutors, Shifting
Strategy, Build New Wall Street Cases, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 2013, 10:00 PM)
[hereinafter
Prostess,
New
Wall
Street
Cases],
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/prosecutors-build-a-better-strategy-to-go-afterwall-street/?hp. These prosecutions were the first to target global banking companies in two
decades. Ben Protess, Leniency Denied, UBS Unit Admits Guilt in Rate Case, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/leniencydenied-ubs-unit-admits-guilt-in-rate-case/?hp. Though these cases only involved foreign
subsidiaries, there is some speculation that the DOJ is laying the groundwork for
prosecutions of parent financial companies. Protess, New Wall Street Cases, supra. Only
time will tell.

MARKOFF - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

836

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/10/2013 12:41 PM

[Vol. 15:3

guilty plea will necessarily involve admitting to a crime and accepting the
resulting stigma, pleading guilty may be the preferable option in some
cases, particularly if doing so would allow the defendant to avoid agreeing
to certain onerous structural reforms that might be attached to a DPA. And
in some extreme cases, if the prosecution has a particularly weak case but
still demands a harsh DPA, it may even be preferable to roll the dice and go
to trial.
Corporate prosecutions are a necessary part of the modern American
legal system. This Article has attempted to answer one of the most
pressing issues in this area of the law: whether and when corporations may
be prosecuted without driving them out of business and causing terrible
consequences to society and the economy. The important, often emotional,
and highly political topic of corporate criminal prosecutions has escaped
empirical scrutiny for too long. It is time to cast aside the gut feelings and
ideological truisms that have thus far dominated the debate and begin
basing our policies on cold data. By showing that there is no evidence that
the “Andersen Effect” exists and thus that the “corporate death penalty” is
no more than a bogeyman, by showing that plea agreements can be used to
obtain structural reforms, and by formulating the basis for a new Core
Business Model of corporate prosecutions, this Article provides a starting
point for an informed, data-driven debate on when and how corporate
criminal prosecutions should occur.
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Appendix A. Companies Convicted 2001 – 2010, With Market Sector and Offense
Exchange –
Ticker

Company

Conviction
Date

Utilicorp United

Mar. 2001

NYSE – UCU

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

Kaydon Corp.

Apr. 2001

NYSE – KDN

Manufacturing

False Statements/
Obstruction

Sara Lee Corp.

June 2001

NYSE – SLE

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

MacDermid, Inc.

Nov. 2001

NYSE – MRD

Chemicals/
Materials

Environmental/Food
Safety

ICN
Pharmaceuticals

Dec. 2001

NYSE – ICN

Pharmaceuticals

Fraud

Carnival Corp.

Apr. 2002

NYSE – CCL

Services

False Statements/
Obstruction

Ashland Inc.

May 2002

NYSE – ASH

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

ICN
Pharmaceuticals

June 2002

NYSE – ICN

Pharmaceuticals

Environmental/Food
Safety

Koppers
Industries

Aug. 2002

NYSE– KOP

Chemicals/
Materials

Environmental/Food
Safety

OMI Corp.

Jan. 2004

NYSE – OMM

Transportation

Environmental/Food
Safety

Crompton Corp.

Mar. 2004

NYSE – CK

Chemicals/
Materials

Antitrust

Nash-Finch Co.

Aug. 2004

NASDAQ –
NAFC

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

Titan Corp.

Mar. 2005

NYSE – TTN

Defense

FCPA

ConAgra Foods

Sep. 2005

NYSE – CAG

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

Eli Lilly

Dec. 2005

NYSE – LLY

Pharmaceuticals

Pharma/Drug

Winn-Dixie
Stores

Apr. 2006

NASDAQ –
WINN

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

Chiquita Brands
Int'l

Mar. 2007

NYSE – CQB

Food

Terrorist Transactions

Sector

Offense
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Overseas
Shipholding
Group

Mar. 2007

NYSE – OSB

Transportation

False Statements/
Obstruction

ITT Corp.

Mar. 2007

NYSE – ITT

Defense

Export Violations

Bristol Myers
Squibb

June 2007

NYSE – BMY

Pharmaceuticals

False Statements/
Obstruction

Honeywell
International

Sep. 2007

NYSE – HON

Manufacturing

Environmental/Food
Safety

Rowan
Companies

Oct. 2007

NYSE – RDC

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

Energy Partners,
Ltd.

Feb. 2008

NYSE – EPL

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

Archer Daniels
Midland Co.

Mar. 2008

NYSE – ADM

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

MTS Systems
Corp.

Mar. 2008

NASDAQ –
MTSC

Manufacturing

Export Violations

XTO Energy

Apr. 2008

NYSE – XTO

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

Cephalon

Sep. 2008

NASDAQ –
CHR

Pharmaceuticals

Pharma/Drug

Herley Industries

May 2008

NASDAQ –
HRLY

Defense

False
Statements/Obstruction

Exxon Mobil
Corp.

Sep. 2008

NYSE – XOM

Energy

Environmental/Food
Safety

Eli Lilly

Jan. 2009

NYSE – LLY

Pharmaceuticals

Pharma/Drug

Tyson Foods,
Inc.

June 2009

NYSE – TSN

Food

Environmental/Food
Safety

Innospec, Inc.

Mar. 2010

NASDAQ –
IOSP

Chemicals/
Materials

FCPA

Allergan

Sep. 2010

NYSE – AGN

Pharmaceuticals

Pharma/Drug

G&K Services

Sep. 2010

NASDAQ –
GKSR

Services

Environmental/Food
Safety

Ibiden Co., Ltd

Oct. 2001

TYO – 4062

Manufacturing

Antitrust

Morgan Crucible
Co.

Nov. 2002

LSE – MGCR

Manufacturing

False
Statements/Obstruction

Rhodia Inc.

June 2004

Euronext –
RHA

Chemicals/
Materials

Environmental/Food
Safety

Infineon
Technologies AG

Oct. 2004

FWB – IFX

Manufacturing

Antitrust
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Bayer AG

Dec. 2004

FWB – BAYN

Chemicals/
Materials

Antitrust

Hynix
Semiconductor

May 2005

KRX – 000660

Manufacturing

Antitrust

Samsung
Electronics Corp.

Oct. 2005

KRX – 005930

Manufacturing

Antitrust

Elpida Memory

Mar. 2006

TYO – 6665

Manufacturing

Antitrust

Solvay S.A.

Mar. 2006

Euronext –
SOLB

Chemicals/
Materials

Antitrust

Bennett
Environmental
Inc.

Jul. 2007

TSE – BEI

Services

Fraud

Air France/KLM

Jul. 2007

Euronext – AF

Transportation

Antitrust

British Airways

Aug. 2007

LSE – BAY

Transportation

Antitrust

Qantas Airways

Nov. 2007

ASX – QAN

Transportation

Antitrust

Japan Airlines
International

May 2008

TYO – 9205

Transportation

Antitrust

Cathay Pacific
Airways Ltd.

Aug. 2008

SEHK – 0293

Transportation

Antitrust

Siemens AG

Dec. 2008

FWB – SIE

Manufacturing

FCPA

Sharp Corp.

Dec. 2008

TYO – 6753

Manufacturing

Antitrust

LG Display Co.,
Ltd.

Dec. 2008

KRX – 034220

Manufacturing

Antitrust

BAE Systems
PLC

Mar. 2010

LSE – BA

Defense

FCPA

Panasonic Corp.

Nov. 2010

TYO – 6752

Manufacturing

Antitrust
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Appendix B. Companies Convicted 2001 – 2010, Plea Details and Company Fate

Company

Compliance
Plan
Monitor

Total
Penalty

Fate

Time

Utilicorp United

UNK

UNK

1,000,000

Other

Failed

> 3 years

Kaydon Corp.

UNK

UNK

1,000,000

Active

N/A

Sara Lee Corp.

UNK

UNK

3,200,000

Active

N/A

MacDermid,
Inc.

UNK

UNK

2,003,000

Merged

> 3 years

ICN
Pharmaceuticals

UNK

UNK

5,600,000

Merged

> 3 years

Carnival Corp.

Y

N

18,000,000

Active

N/A

Ashland Inc.

UNK

UNK

9,150,000

Active

N/A

ICN
Pharmaceuticals

UNK

UNK

40,000

Merged

> 3 years

Koppers
Industries

Y

UNK

3,000,000

Active

N/A

OMI Corp.

UNK

UNK

4,200,000

Merged

> 3 years

Crompton Corp.

N

N

50,000,000

Merged

> 1 year

Nash-Finch Co.

UNK

UNK

400,000

Active

N/A

Titan Corp.

UNK

UNK

28,500,000

Merged

< 1 year

ConAgra Foods

UNK

UNK

250,000

Active

N/A

Eli Lilly

Y

N

30,000,000

Active

N/A

Winn-Dixie
Stores

UNK

UNK

200,000

Failed

> 3 years

Chiquita Brands
Int’l

Y

N

25,000,000

PW,
Coop.

Active

N/A

Overseas
Shipholding
Group

Y

Y

37,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

ITT Corp.

N

N

30,000,000

Active

N/A

Bristol Myers
Squibb

N

N

1,000,000

Active

N/A

Honeywell
International

Y

N

10,000,000

Active

N/A

Rowan
Companies

UNK

UNK

8,000,000

Active

N/A

Coop.

Coop.
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Energy
Partners, Ltd.

N

N

100,000

Archer Daniels
Midland Co.

N

N

MTS Systems
Corp.

N

XTO Energy

Coop.

841

Failed

> 1 year

100,000

Active

N/A

N

400,000

Active

N/A

Y

N

20,000

Merged

> 1 year

Cephalon

N

N

425,000,000

Merged

> 1 year

Herley
Industries

N

N

6,000,000

Merged

> 1 year

Exxon Mobil
Corp.

Y

N

600,000

Active

N/A

Eli Lilly

Y

UNK

1,615,000,000

Active

N/A

Tyson Foods,
Inc.

N

N

500,000

Active

N/A

Innospec, Inc.

Y

Y

14,100,000

Active

N/A

Allergan

Y

N

650,000,000

Active

N/A

G&K Services

N

N

450,000

Active

N/A

Ibiden Co., Ltd

UNK

UNK

3,600,000

Active

N/A

Morgan
Crucible Co.

N

N

1,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Rhodia Inc.

N

N

18,000,000

Comm.
Service

Merged

> 3 years

Infineon
Technologies
AG

N

N

160,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Bayer AG

N

N

66,000,000

Active

N/A

Hynix
Semiconductor

N

N

185,000,000

Coop.

Merged

> 3 years

Samsung
Electronics
Corp.

N

N

300,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Elpida Memory

N

N

84,000,000

Coop.

Failed

> 3 years

Solvay S.A.

N

N

40,870,000

Active

N/A
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Bennett
Environmental
Inc.

UNK

UNK

2,662,000

Active

N/A

Air
France/KLM

N

N

350,000,000

Active

N/A

British Airways

N

N

300,000,000

Merged

> 3 years

Qantas Airways

N

N

61,000,000

Active

N/A

Japan Airlines
International

N

N

110,000,000

Coop.

Failed

> 1 year

Cathay Pacific
Airways Ltd.

N

N

60,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Siemens AG

Y

Y

448,500,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Sharp Corp.

N

N

120,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

LG Display Co.,
Ltd.

N

N

400,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

BAE Systems
PLC

Y

Y

400,000,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Panasonic Corp.

N

N

49,100,000

Coop.

Active

N/A

Coop.

